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Journal of Information Science and Engineering, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 1153-1158


Comments on Shao-Cao's Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme from PKC 2009

MIN-RONG CHEN1,2, XI ZHANG3,+ AND XIA LI2
1Management School 
Jinan University 
Guangzhou, 510632 P. R. China 
2College of Information Engineering 
3College of Computer and Software 
Shenzhen University 
Shenzhen, 518060 P.R. China

    Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss, allows a semirusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended for Bob. In PKC'09, Shao and Cao proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, and compared their scheme with Libert-Vergnaud's pairing- based unidirectional PRE scheme from PKC’08. In this paper, we indicated that Shao-Cao's scheme is not secure against chosen-plaintext attack in Libert-Vergnaud's security model.

Keywords: proxy re-encryption, chosen-ciphertext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, bilinear pairing, transformed ciphertext

  Retrieve PDF document (JISE_201103_22.pdf)